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SCIENCE , HUMANITY, AND ATROCI TY:
A LAWYE RLY EXAMINATION
*
Steven D. Smith

THE SONG SP ARROW AND THE CHILD: CLAIMS OF SCIENCE AND HUMANITY.
By Joseph Vining. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 2004. Pp.
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Just over half a century ago, researchers in occupied Manchuria con
ducted experiments on "logs": this was their term for the human beings on
whom they were experimenting. The term arose, possibly, from research on
frostbite. "[T]hose seized for medical experiments," a later report explained,
were taken outside in freezing weather and left with exposed arms, peri
odically drenched with water, until a guard decided that frostbite had set
in .... [T]his was determined after the "frozen arms, when struck with a
short stick,emitted a sound resembling that which a board gives when it is
'
struck."

In one experiment, the "log" was a three-day-old baby. The researchers
reported on how they overcame one obstacle in this case: "Usually a hand of
a three-day-old infant is clenched into a fist . . . but by sticking the needle in
[the baby's finger], the middle finger could be kept straight to make the ex
2
periment easier."
Joseph Vining's3 reflection on (as the subtitle indicates) the claims of
science and humanity begins with a terse but disturbing recitation of these
and similar scientific experiments conducted on human beings during the
*

Warren Distinguished P rofessor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A. 1976, Brigham
Young; J.D. 1979, Yale. -Ed. I thank Chris Eberle, David McGowan, Michael Perry, Sai P rakash,
Merina Smith, and George Wright for h elpful comments on an earlier draft.
I. P. 6 (quoting Nicholas D. Kristof, Japan Confronting Gruesome War Atrocity, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1995, at A l , reporting on the human experimentation in Manchuria from 19321945) (alterations and omissions in original).

2.

Pp. 6-7, 10 (quoting Kristof, supra note 1) (omission in original).

3.

Harry Burns Hutchins Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
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twentieth century in Manchuria, Nazi Germany, and Pol Pot's Cambodia.
The incidents are conveyed through quotations, sometimes of the coldly
clinical prose that the researchers themselves chose as most suitable for their
purposes. These quotations are juxtaposed against others from an array of
distinguished scientists and philosophers explaining the naturalistic cosmol
ogy that, in the view of these thinkers, modern science has given us: it is a
stark, cold cosmos without inherent meaning, purpose, or value. "The more
the universe seems comprehensible," Nobel Prize-winning physicist Steven
4
Weinberg remarks, "the more it also seems pointless."
In this pointless universe, "living creatures just are very complicated
5
physico-chemical mechanisms," J.J.C. Smart explains. And what of our
selves-of human beings? Another Nobel Prize winner, Franc;ois Jacob,
instructs us:
Biology has demonstrated that there is no metaphysical entity hidden be
hind the word "life." ... From particles to man, there is a whole series of
integration,of levels,of discontinuities . But there is no breach either in the
composition of the objects or in the reactions that take place in them; no
6
change in "essence."

What are we supposed to make of this pairing of descriptions of moral
enormities with statements of a scientific worldview? Is Vining trying to do
to science what critics often do to Christianity when they give descriptions
highlighting, for example, the sexual abuses of clergy or the Inquisition
thereby condemning a whole movement of life and thought by equating it
with the abuses that any large-scale enterprise involving human beings will
occasionally produce? If so, readers might well toss the book aside as a
cranky manifestation of the "antiscience" that is one of the book's abiding
concerns. To be sure, scientists sometimes behave unfeelingly, just as other
humans do. But there is nothing intrinsic to the scientific method or world
view that leads to the atrocities of Manchuria or Nazi Germany: that much is
obvious.
Or is it? The question runs through Vining's multifaceted meditation,
and the answers that gradually, tentatively emerge are complicated, provoca
tive, and counter to the culture that prevails in much of academia today. In
that and other respects, The Song Sparrow and the Child is continuous with
7
earlier writings that have established Vining among the more profoundly
challenging but also more idiosyncratic and elusive (and as a result, I be
lieve, underappreciated) legal thinkers in recent decades.

4. P. 11 (quoting STEVEN WEINBERG, THE FIRST THREE MINUTES: A MODERN Vrnw OF
THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE 154 (1993).
5. P. 8 (quoting J.J.C. Smart, Professor Ziff on Robots, in MINDS AND MACHINES 104, 105
(Alan Ross Anderson ed., 1964).
6. P. 9 (quoting FRAN�OIS JACOB, Tin: LOGIC OF LIFE: A HISTORY OF HEREDITY and THE
POSSIBLE AND THE ACTUAL 306 (Betty s. Spillmann trans., 1982).
7.
See JosEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP (1995); JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITA
TIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986).
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The elusiveness of Vining's work does not result, as is so often the case,
from ponderous prose or jargonistic terminology: on the contrary, Vining's
vocabulary is modest and often poetic, and his prose can be lyrical. It may
be that readers are simply not accustomed to a legal author whose sensibility
and message seem more characteristic of a poet than of either a traditional
doctrinal technician or of a law-and-whatever type. In any case, there is no
pretending that this book is an easy read. Its difficulty may induce already
deluged scholars and students to set the book aside in favor of more accessi
ble and immediately usable material. That would be unfortunate, because
they would thereby miss hearing one of the voices in the legal academy
most worth listening to. Consequently, my aspiration in this review will be
not so much to give a critical evaluation of Vining's claims as to provide a
sort of reader's guide to this important book.
One who offers himself as a guide takes on risks, of course. One risk is
that the would-be guide will be undertaking to help his pupils through ter
rain that he himself understands only very imperfectly. But that limitation is
an acknowledged feature of most tours. You do not expect the guide you pay
to show you highlights of London or the Louvre to know everything about
the subject: you listen to what the guide has to say and do not embarrass
him with too many hard questions. A different risk is that someone might
accept the quick tour as a substitute for encountering the thing itself, in the
way that undergraduates read the Cliffs Notes for

Crime and Punishment

and never bother to read the actual novel. My own tour of Vining's book will
be intended, among other things, to indicate how much would be missed by
prospective readers who adopted that lazy expedient.
A. Science,

Antiscience, and Totalistic Science

Most conspicuously, this is a book

by a lawyer

writing

about science:

that is unusual and risky and, some might think, audacious. No one, how
ever, will doubt the subject's significance. Of the various influences that
over the last several centuries have shaped and reshaped the way we live and
think, "science" (whatever it is) is surely among the most important. But has
science's overall influence, on balance, been healthy-or destructive? The
question is one that all of us, including lawyers, are entitled to ask.
Taking passages out of context, reading them carelessly, one might eas
ily conclude that Vining views science as pernicious, and that he himself is a
partisan of what he calls "antiscience." And indeed, compared to those sci
entists and philosophers who denigrate antiscience as nothing more than a
destructive and irrational menace, 8 Vining is more understanding of and
sympathetic to this protest.
Even so, Vining himself cannot plausibly be placed in the camp of anti
science. On the contrary, he perceives it as "dangerous" (p. 63). And he is
8. Readers who have not encountered the phenomenon of antiscience or, for that matter, of
virulent anti-antiscience, might quickly browse through the entries under the "Texas Taliban Alerts"
category on the web site Leiter Reports. Leiter Reports, http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/
texas_taliban_alerts/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
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affirming sometimes to the point of extravagance in paying his respects to
science. Thus, Vining speaks of "the deep necessity of science, the scientist
in each of us" (p. 13). Much of what is good in modern life we owe to sci
ence, according to Vining (p.

94).

"Science is a gift," he observes, "as music

is a gift" (p. 27). He elaborates, "science brings gifts, of fascination, of
beauty, of relief from pain, gifts of unclouded thought, of freedom to love;
and in fact these gifts and their effects are enjoyed even by those who live in
a world whose material constitution they deny" (p. 81).
So if (contrary to casual impression) science is not after all the target of
Vining's criticism and concern, what is? The book's first paragraph offers
the answer that is repeated throughout: what Vining finds threatening is not
science but rather "total claims" made in the name of science, or "total the
ory," or "total vision." It is the reductionist insistence that there is ultimately
"nothing but" or "merely" (phrases that Vining finds ominous) the objective
"systems" and "processes" that scientists study-and hence that the kinds of
objectivist and impersonal explanations given by science and valuable for
explaining

some

things can ultimately explain

everything

(including the sci

entists themselves).
Vining's principal target is thus the sort of worldview endorsed by John
Searle, who declares that the world "consists entirely of physical particles in
fields of force, and some of these particles are organized into systems that
9
are conscious biological beasts such as ourselves." Searle goes on to ex
plain that "the simple intuitive idea is that systems are collections of the
particles where the spatio-temporal boundaries of the system are set by
causal relations. . . . Babies, elephants, and mountain ranges are . . . exam
10
ples of systems." It is this totalistic view, and not science itself, that Vining
sees not merely as mistaken but as a threat to humanity-and even, para
doxically perhaps, to science itself (which in Vining's view appears to be the
sort of healthy golden mean threatened on one side by antiscience and on
the other by total vision).
Much of the book is thus devoted to describing and understanding this
total vision-not only its substance but also its mindset and its tone. The
affirmative substance of total vision is conveyed in part through quotations
such as that from Searle given above. The book provides numerous similar
instances and expressions. In this reductionist view, "the brain is merely a
11
meat machine." As noted neurobiologist Jean-Pierre Changeux puts it,
12
"[t]he brain secretes thought as the liver does bile." The same scientist ex
plains that beliefs-which can be "defined as a specific state of nerve cell

9.
(1995).

P. 8 (quoting JoHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, at xi-xii

10. Id. (quoting JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 86-87 (1992)) (omis
sions in original).
11.

P. 48 (quoting a colleague of Joseph Weizenbaum).

12. P. 54 (quoting JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX & ALAIN CONNES, CONVERSATIONS ON MIND,
MATTER, AND MATHEMATICS 154-155 (M.B. DeBevoise ed., trans., 1995).
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activity"-are comparable to diseases: "they can propagate from one brain
13
to another, and spread 'infection' much as viral attacks do."
But the nature of total theory is hardly captured by reporting its affirma
tive claims in propositional form. On the contrary, Vining suggests that total
14
theory has the qualities of a "creed" or faith (p. 26)-or an anti-faith -and
just as Christian creeds developed largely in response to perceived heresies,
the character of the naturalistic creed is more clearly manifest in what it
aggressively

denies

than in what it

affirms.

Total theory conspicuously

leaves some elements out of its account of the world: purpose, spirit, tran
scendence, divinity (p. 43). But it does not merely omit these elements; it
15
belligerently opposes them and seeks to root them out with a kind of cen
16
sorious zeal. Thus, for Nobel Prize-winner Jacques Monod, "Judeo
Christian religiosity" is not merely false; it (along with, by the way, "scien
tistic progressism, belief in the 'natural' rights of man, and utilitarian
17
pragmatism") is "disgusting." Such notions, Monod insists, "afflict[] and
rend[] the conscience of anyone provided with some element of culture, a
18
little intelligence."

13. P. 53 (quoting CttANGEUX & CONNES, supra note 12, at 227) . Such statements may
support Vining's observation of a connection between totalistic science and a tone or aesthetic of
"ugliness." P. 45. But the view can also be presented poetically:
In the competing vision we have seen, of a world of swirling flux from beginning to end or
without beginning or end, in which all, including mathematics and the mathematician, be
comes processes and processes of processes, system dissolving into system, things merely
happen .... Things merely happen and nothing can be more important than anything else be
cause it is merely something happening.There is no such thing as catastrophe.The raging fire
that caught up with the smoke jumpers in Norman MacLean's Young Men and Fire is grass
burning. Grass burning is just something happening. Flesh burning is no different. The wind
rises, the fuel changes, the temperature escalates, the spread accelerates, process builds on
process, the organization of the fire replaces the organization of a tree, of a human body, and
then the fire is gone.
P. 109 (footnote omitted).
14.

Seep. 73 (" '[F]aith,' like 'belief,' becomes a negative term.").

15.
Seesupra note 8. Commenting on Changeux's expression of "amazement " that mathematicians can still sometimes talk of divinity, Vining observes:
The use of the word "astonish" or "amaze" can be put down as just one of the pejoratives
sprinkling late-twentieth-century discussion.... Stand back, and look again at the range of
discussion in the essays, books, and popularizations that appeared in such great numbers in the
second half of the twentieth century: the reaching to deny spirit-and reference to "theism" as
a counterdenial of scientific truth-is striking. It is constant and widespread.Anything to the
contrary "amazes" and "astonishes." Even Newton and Einstein astonish.
Pp. 72-73.
16. Although he does not enter into the debates or take sides, Vining does comment on the
censorious quality of the campaign to exclude creationism or "intelligent design" from the schools:
"Strange, this struggle over the minds of young children-<me might think that the theory of evolu
tion, appealing, simple, fertile, fascinating, like a beautiful equation in mathematics, could fend for
itself when presented to curious young minds." P. 28.
17.
P. 50 (quoting JACQUES MONOD, CHANCE AND NECESSITY: AN ESSAY ON THE NATURAL
PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN BIOLOGY 171 (Austryn Wainhouse trans., 1971).
18.

Id. (quoting MoNOD, supra note 17, at 171).
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Pondering such denunciations, Vining wonders whether what is called
" 'science' . . . is molded by and is inseparable from the enemy it constructs
to hate" (p. 75). And he detects in "late twentieth-century cosmological
speculation . . . the psychology of the adolescent who doesn't understand,
and who destroys . . ." (pp. 76-77).
With totalistic science, as with other creeds, heresy and error are always
cropping up not only among the unenlightened but within the congregation
of the (anti-)faithful as well, and they must above all be weeded out from
that field. Thus, with a sort of monastic severity, Changeux exhorts mathe
matician Alain Coones that "[t]he materialist program" involves "an act of
self-discipline"

through which even the scientifically converted must
19
"eliminate" within themselves "all remaining traces of transcendence."
And as if to allay suspicions of heretical tendencies, Coones concurs: "I
grant that the brain . . . has nothing of the divine about it, that it owes noth
20
ing to transcendence whatsoever." Philosopher Daniel Dennett pronounces
that if progress is to be made in artificial intelligence, "we have to give up
our awe of living things" (p.

48).

And with sadness, Vining describes one of

his favorite science authors, Lewis Thomas ("He was a wonderful man and I
keep his books on a special shelf' (p. 23)), who in Vining's view struggled
to conform his gift for seeing beauty and meaning in the world to the de
mands of the hardened worldview of totalistic science. Hence the wonderful,
but sometimes troubled, quality of Thomas's writings-tossing out then
hastily disowning insights and intuitions and hypotheses that "[m]y scientist
21
alluding to the irrepressible likelihood of some

friends will not be liking,"

thing in the universe that transcends material processes but then passing off
such allusions as mere playfulness or jokes-"jokes being the freedom of
the oppressed," as Vining says (p. 31).
Central to Vining's discussion is a distinction between science itself and
totalistic science. But is this distinction an illusory one? Or do the assump
tions on which science is conducted necessarily commit its devotees to
making totalistic claims? Vining thinks not. "There are great scientists," he
reminds us, "from Newton to Einstein who are not troubled by divinity, nor
driven by a desire to eliminate it from the thought and speech of all" (p. 27).
But perhaps these luminaries merely lacked the sorts of little minds that
22
could be bothered by the hobgoblin of consistency? Vining's perception is
that over the course of the twentieth century, totalistic claims from scientists
and science-admiring philosophers seem to have grown more insistent and
aggressive-and censorious: the assertions quoted earlier from Weinberg,
Searle, Dennett, and Changeux constitute just part of the evidence.

19.

P. 81 (quoting CHANGEUX & CONNES, supra note 12, at 25).

20.

P. 52 (quoting CHANGEUX & CONNES, supra note 12, at 26).

21.

P. 25 (quoting LEWIS THOMAS, THE FRAGILE SPECIES 192 (1992).

22. CJ RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 257, 263 (William H. Gilman ed., 1965) (1841) ("A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin
of little minds . . . . ).
"
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These are thinkers whose scientific or philosophical credentials may be
intimidating to most of us, so their apparently total confidence in asserting a
totalistic view carries force. How might such assertions be resisted? Should
they be resisted? Like Vining, some of us might find the comprehensively
naturalistic worldview unappealing-so what? Since when did theories get
accepted or rejected based on whether we find them edifying, or flattering,
or spiritually uplifting? And one more thing: What qualifications does a
mere law professor possess to stand up against such formidable authorities?
B.

What Do We Believe, Really?

Given his dark portrayal of "total theories" and their implications, we
might expect from Vining a vigorous, head-on assault on such theories.
What we get instead is a more oblique and measured (and, perhaps, frustrat
ing) response--0ne constituted by an apparently meandering meditation that
circles around and around recurring themes. To appreciate this response, we
need to consider Vining's somewhat unusual understanding of the character
of believing and, hence, of the function and limits of reasoning.
Most of us probably think of our beliefs as being immediately transpar
ent to us. Asked what you believe about something, you can simply look
inside yourself and then report whatever belief you find there; the belief
might be false, of course, but your sincere statement that it is your belief (at
least as of the time of the report) seems unassailable. If you say you believe
X and someone says, "no, you don't," the objector will seem merely boorish
and obtuse--0n both an epistemic and etiquette level.
Vining has a different conception. In his view, a belief is not simply a
readily observable propositional piece on our cognitive chessboard: it is
something less on the surface and instead more rooted in the depths of our
being. Discovering what we believe-what we really, genuinely believe
involves not a simple introspection and report but rather a more serious and
searching investigation of . . . well, of what we think we believe, yes, but
also of how we live, what we desire, what we would and would not be will
ing to do. It may tum out, upon close examination, that people do not really
believe some of what they casually thought they believed, and that they do
23
believe some of what they thought they did not. To raise that possibility is
not to insult; rather, "an inquiry into actual belief, asking for candor . . . is
according a dignity to the one of whom the demand is made"(p. 27).
Consistent with this personal and holistic conception of belief, the
function of reasoning is.not, for Vining, merely to marshal arguments-to
"move from proposition to proposition" (p. 2}-so as to construct a proof or

23.

Vining states:

We may think we believe something here, or do not believe something there, but we do not
have the last word on what we believe unless we read ourselves as a whole, in the same way
we read others to determine what it is they are really saying and what it is they actually be
lieve.

P. 16.
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demonstration in order to compel someone to accept a proposition different
than the one she started with. That sort of exercise hardly ever succeeds, and
it would be quite pointless even if it did succeed, because the underlying
beliefs might well remain unaffected by the dialectical exercise. No genuine
assent would result. "Binding you to me by successful moves of my mind
would lose all that can be hoped for" (p. 2).
Instead, Vining conceives the function of reasoning and reflection to be
that of enlisting us in the enterprise of examining our actions, assumptions,
commitments, and ways of talking in order to determine what we really be
24
lieve. This must be a cooperative enterprise -one that aims to achieve self
understanding, candor (a virtue on which Vining places great emphasis), and
genuine assent. We may well change our opinions during the course of the
enterprise, but the change will typically come not because we are coerced by
logic into repudiating our previous position, but rather because we become
able to acknowledge beliefs that at some level we have held all along with
out being wholly conscious of them, or perhaps without being willing to
own up to them.
Vining's book is his attempt to engage in such mutual reflection with re
spect to science and the claims of total theory-hence its circling, searching
approach. His project will doubtless succeed with some readers and vex
others, but it should already be clear why reading a distillation of the reflec
tion, such as this one, cannot substitute for reading the book itself (or, for
that matter, why a quick skimming of the book in the way we "read" so
many books today would be pointless). With this sort of book, it is not just a
matter of finding out the conclusion, or even of extracting the "argument":
the journey is essential. So it would be as sensible to say that if you look
over a synopsis of King Lear you do not need to read the play itself, or that
(as my wife sometimes proposes to me) you do not need to watch the game
because you can find out the score in tomorrow's newspaper.
Vining's conception of the enterprise points to one reason why he thinks
that lawyers-not just those who are officially licensed by the state but oth
ers as well, because "[t]here is the lawyer and law in all of us" (p. 1)-have
a valuable role to play in debates about total claims involving science. That
is because the question as he conceives it is not so much whether a scientific
explanation of some particular fact or phenomenon is correct, but whether
anyone-you, me, the scientists themselves-actually believes in the totalis
tic worldview that so many modern scientists and other thinkers publicly
sponsor. It is lawyers, after all, who examine and cross-examine and reex
amine, and who probe for inauthenticity and suppression of truth. So in
trying to discern what you and I-and Steven Weinberg, and John Searle
really believe, we must "[d]o what lawyers do with witnesses' testimony,"

24.
"Belief is what attaches words to reality; and it is up to the listener to determine whether
belief is there, and it is the listener who can help the speaker see whether belief is there." P. 149.
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25
treating even the "doctors or scientists or mathematicians [as] witnesses."
Do we and they believe, all things considered, that we are "nothing but" or
"merely" complicated material "systems" and "processes"? We may say we
believe this, but do we really?
That is Vining's question. Someone might object that this is not the only
question, or the most cogent one. It might be, after all, that the reductionist
worldview is true even if hardly any of us can bring ourselves entirely to
embrace it--or, for that matter, that this worldview is not true even if many
of us do sincerely believe it. Shouldn't the question be what the truth is, not
what we believe?
Perhaps. But I suppose Vining might reply that we deceive ourselves
with this distinction. There is no escaping the fact that it is we-we finite,
fallible, alternately credulous and skeptical human beings-who are posing
the questions, and we are posing them for ourselves and our purposes. Sepa
rated from the question of what we believe, the question of what the truth is
can mean nothing to us.
So the question posed is whether we-scientists included-really be
lieve in the totalistic claims that sometimes emanate from scientists. Vining
adopts a variety of strategies for pursuing that question.
C. Science as a Human Enterprise
One strategy is to examine closely the scientific enterprise itself to see
whether it can be reduced to the sorts of objective, impersonal "systems" and
"processes" into which it attempts to reduce its own subjects of study. In Vin
ing's examination, it turns out that science itself is a deeply human and
personal enterprise. Consequently, and ironically, if the totalistic, person
reducing claims sometimes asserted by scientists were actually true, and
were fully accepted, the scientific enterprise would be impossible.
In conducting this examination, Vining stresses the dependence of sci
ence on assent. The objective conclusions of a scientific experiment are not
self-validating and self-executing, as it were: they must win the assent of
persons--of the community of scientists and, for that matter, of non
scientists (pp. 85-91). Science is a cooperative enterprise. No single scien
tist can personally verify or vouch for more than an infinitesimal fraction of
the sum of scientific knowledge; each must rely on the work and reports of
others, and in order to do that each scientist must be able to assume that
other scientists are working in good faith (pp. 93-101). These qualities
"assent" and "good faith"-are irreducibly personal in nature.
What is the significance of these observations? In some respects they re
semble a familiar argument made by, among others, C.S. Lewis in a famous
debate with the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. Lewis argued in essence
that a comprehensively naturalistic worldview cancels itself out because if

25. Pp. 16 17. "Everyone moving to a position on what he or she believes in is something of
the position of a lawyer. Everyone is attending to testimony: to her own testimony to h erself . . . and
to the testimony of others." P. 17.
,
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that worldview were correct, it would follow that all of our beliefs
including our belief in a naturalistic worldview-are the product of nonra
tional natural causes, such as chemical processes in the brain. But there is
no epistemic efficacy in chemical processes, and we put no stock in beliefs
determined by natural causes. So if you believe in the naturalistic world
view, the logic of your own belief should cause you to abandon this belief:
naturalism thus "cuts its own throat."26 Lewis thought this criticism was
compelling; Anscombe did not. 27 At the very least, Lewis's argument points
to a paradoxical quality in comprehensive naturalism--one that manifests
itself in debates not only about epistemology but about free will as well. 28
Vining's reflections resemble Lewis's argument insofar as Vining sug
gests that if the claims of totalistic science were true, science itself would be
subverted. In this sense, total theory may appear to be self-cancelling. But it
seems that Vining's point is not the rationalist one that totalistic science has
somehow been refated by a demonstration of inconsistency. That conclusion
might or might not be justified, but even if it is, what would be gained by
the demonstration? The confirmed naturalist might respond, "Okay, you've
identified a difficulty in my argument-a sort of paradox. I commend you
for your cleverness. But you haven't shown--or even purported to show
that the naturalist position is false. Nor have you said anything that compels
me to abandon my belief in naturalism. And in fact, I still believe it."
It is precisely at this point, I think, that Vining's reflections become rele
vant. His goal is not so much to demonstrate that totalistic science is self
refuting on a merely analytical level, but rather to show that even the scien
tists who make totalistic claims themselves do not and cannot fully believe
in those claims. So in response to the defiant assertion "I still believe it,"
Vining's message seems to be: "No, actually you don't. You believe in sci
ence and the natural world, of course. But if you reflect candidly on your
actions and commitments as a whole, even including your commitments to
science, you will see that you do not and never did believe in reductionist
naturalism-not as the whole story."

26. See, e.g., C.S. Lewis, Religion Without Dogma?, in Goo IN THE DOCK: EsSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS 129, 137 (Walter Hooper ed., 1970) (1946):
Every particular thought (whether it is a judgment of fact or a judgment of value) is always and
by all men discounted the moment they believe that it can be explained, without remainder, as
the result of irrational causes. Whenever you know that what the other man is saying is wholly
due to his complexes or to a bit of bone pressing on his brain, you cease to attach any impor
tance of it. But if naturalism were true then all thoughts whatever would be wholly the result of
irrational causes. Therefore, all thoughts would be equally worthless. Therefore, naturalism is
worthless. If it is true, then we can know no truths. It cuts its own throat.

G.E.M. Anscombe, A Reply to Mr. C.S. Lewis's Argument that "Naturalism" is Se/f
2 METAPHYSICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MtND: THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS OF G.E.M. ANSCOMBE 225 (1981). For a synopsis of the debate between Lewis and
Anscombe, see WALTER HOOPER, c.s. LEWIS: A COMPANION & GUIDE 618-20 (1996).
27.

See

Refuting, in

28.
See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, The Dilemma of Determinism, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND
OTHER EssAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN IMMORTALITY: Two SUPPOSED OBJECTIONS
TO THE DOCTRINE 145 (1956) (1884).
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D. Atrocities and the Morality of Scientists
It is not only reflection on the scientific enterprise and its methods that
leads Vining to this understanding. He is also led there (and he seeks to lead
us there) by pondering the significance of the moral atrocities, large and
small, that were so conspicuous in the last century: in Manchuria, Germany,
and Cambodia, to mention the most flagrant examples. From start to finish,
these atrocities loom over the discussion.
The claim is not exactly that scientific research leads to atrocities (al
though it can, sometimes), or that scientists are moral monsters (although a
few are). On the contrary, although he worries about the potentially destruc
tive consequences of total theory,29 Vining seems to think that, by and large,
people who devote themselves to science are admirable, moral beings. In
their most truly scientific work they are "driven by love and awe" (p. 39), by
a "passion for truth" (p. 134), and by the "fascination," "beauty," and aspira
tion to "unclouded thought" and even "freedom to love" that science can
give us (p. 81). Both their work and their writings about their work reflect
admirable, and deeply moral, commitments-to each other, to humanity and
future generations, and to the pursuit of truth.
But now comes the troubling question: How do the partisans of science
explain and justify these moral values and commitments? Or more precisely,
how do they explain and justify them within the framework and on the im
personal assumptions of totalistic science? This is the central incongruity
explored throughout the book: the frequent and apparently sincere expres
sion of moral commitments and aspirations by people who purport to hold a
worldview within which, in Vining's view, these commitments and aspira
tions lack justification and indeed come close to being unintelligible.
Thus, most people (including nearly all scientists) react with moral out
rage upon learning of the experiments on human beings conducted in
occupied Manchuria or Nazi Germany. But why? We routinely perform sci
entific experiments on animals, after all, and although the practice can be
controversial we do not typically experience the same moral indignation as
we do in cases of experimentation on humans. Suppose that humans are
"merely" complex natural "systems," as total theory tells us they are, and
that there is no difference in "essence" between humans and animals, as
30
Nobelist Fran�ois Jacob declares. Suppose we are, in John Gray's phrase,
31
"straw dogs." So then why do we draw such a drastic distinction here?
29.

Vining states:

We know that conventional limits and restraints can change with belief about the ultimate na
ture of things. The twentieth century has its warning examples, most gruesome where total
vision has appeared in social and political thought. The connection between what we think
about the nature of the world, and what we allow ourselves to do, is now widely felt, and, with
good reason, widely feared.
Pp. 1-2.
30.

See

supra note 6 and surrounding text.

31. JOHN GRAY, STRAW Doos: THOUGHTS ON HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS (2002). Gray's
book provides an interesting counterpoint to Vining's. There are obvious similarities and parallels:
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How do we account for our conviction that experimenting on the sparrow is
so radically different than experimenting on the child? This is the central
question that Vining presses over and over throughout the book. (Although,
as we will see, from a different direction he himself doubts the cogency of
the line between sparrow and child.)
Nor is it merely our (and the scientists') condemnation of large-scale
moral enormities that is in tension with the totalistic worldview so fre
quently professed. In fact, the writings even of scientists who assert
totalistic claims teem with assertions of value, obligation, caring, and moral
commitment. These assertions seem to be sincere, Vining suggests, but once
again, they are hard to place within the naturalistic framework that these
TI
wnters purport to embrace.
Once again, we can ask what the significance of these incongruities is.
Do they show that the partisans of totalistic science are guilty of inconsis
tency, or of a so-called "performative contradiction"? Perhaps, but this is not
exactly Vining's charge. Analytical philosophers would likely respond to
such a charge with a host of conceptual distinctions calculated to dissolve
(or deflate, or at least obfuscate) the apparent contradiction, while scientists
themselves-evolutionary psychologists, for example-might respond with
explanations of how a species might evolve so as to favor, say, the carriers
of its own genetic materials. But Vining's inquiry is subtly different. The
question is not whether a satisfactory philosophical defense of the moral
distinction between the sparrow and the child could be developed (a defense
that could operate to exonerate from a charge of inconsistency people who
in fact were never even aware of the defense), nor is it whether our embrace
of that distinction can be scientifically explained.
The question, rather, is what our words and actions in this matter tell us
about what, in fact, we really believe. And Vining thinks that, despite some
protestations to the contrary, most of us really believe in a realm of value
that cannot be reduced to the systems and processes of science and that can
not be adequately accounted for in purely material terms. He thinks that if
•

each perceives and probes the tension between the scientific worldview and the moral commitments
and values so often professed by those who proclaim this worldview. Gray in particular is exercised
by what he views as the hypocrisy and self-deception of those who purport to embrace both science
and the values of liberal humanism. But while Vining seeks to save moral commitment and tran
scendence from the overreachings of science, Gray appears to call for a more candid capitulation.
32. E.g., pp. 30-38, 112-14. For example, regarding Lewis Thomas's concern that although
"life" would continue, deforestation or nuclear holocaust might prevent the survival of future crea
tures "like us," Vining comments:

Why should we care at all ... ? If we are the random product of a billion years of evolution,
and the system does not "see fit" (though those would be forbidden words) to bring forth a
product "like us" in another billion years, what concern is that of ours? The dice roll six, the
dice roll two. The six does not care whether a two or a six is rolled next. The dice themselves
do not care. Only if there is some identification with future creatures, creatures after our indi
vidual death, creatures after the passing of every body that is in material existence at the time
of our own death, identification, real, through a connection other than near succession in time
in the products of the processes of the material world, can there be any claim of the distant fu
ture on our present desires.
Pp. 32-33.
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we exert ourselves to reflection and candor, and if we work up the courage
to speak in good faith, we will acknowledge such beliefs. Although theorists
may say they believe in a merely naturalistic universe, their genuine beliefs
33
are better than their theory-driven professions. John Searle may declare
that babies and animals are merely complex systems of "physical particles
34
in fields of force." "But Searle would stay his hand from vivisecting a hu
man being or pulling out a dog's nails with pliers and then burning it
alive . . . . In staying his hand, he would reveal much" (p. 136).
E. Openings into "Spirit"
Vining's examination is not limited, however, to showing tensions be
tween what we say we believe in some contexts and what we say and do in
other contexts. In a more direct and affirming vein, he asks us to contem
plate what he calls "openings": realms of experience through which, if we
pay close attention, we can sense the reality of something beyond the reduc
tionistic world of systems and can look into the world of what Vining calls,
35
with misgivings, "spirit."
The same openings will not present themselves to everyone. For some,
music will provide this sort of insight (p. 116). I recall in this respect a for
mer colleague who by his own account was incapable of religious faith but
was deeply sensitive to art and music, and who confided to me that he was
troubled by a naturalistic worldview because he could find no real home in
it (as opposed to unsatisfying, tone-deaf evolutionary explanations) for Mo
zart's compositions. The sublimity of Mozart was indisputably real, so if
evolutionary naturalism could not adequately account for it, then, . . . well,
he was not sure what conclusion to draw.
For other people, language, with its intricacies and subtleties and poetry,
provides an opening. For still others, land-fields, mountains, forests
offers a glimpse. Death can be yet another source of insight: "Speak of
death, stand up and uncover the head in respect for death, and you have
stepped through the opening, something has come to you through the open
ing" (pp. 115-16).
Still another opening, Vining suggests, can be discovered by careful re
flection on "the large fact of law" (p. 108)-and on our long-standing
insistence in law on a distinction between the "authoritative" and the "au
thoritarian." The latter-the exertion of physical power to force others to do
what one wants-might be rendered intelligible in purely naturalistic terms.
But real authority, as Vining understands it, is a different and more mysteri
ous matter: authority is something that we understand not as coercing us,
exactly, but as having an authentic claim on our attention and respect. What

33. "I do not think they believe what they seem to say. The scientist or mathematician speak
ing cosmologically does not cease to be a person speaking, and acting." P. 12.
34.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

35.
"Let us use the word 'spirit' again until talk can go beyond it." P. 1 23 Vining wonders
whether "life" might be a better term but tentatively decides against it. P p. 143-45.
.
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is it that might have such a quality? The question cannot be answered in
purely naturalistic and impersonal terms. Even so, we search for and believe
in authority. The fact that we do this, Vining suggests, indicates again a be
36
lief in something beyond the naturalistic.
On a more intimate level, perhaps the most pervasive and important
opening is simply the presence of other people-of human beings. Speaking
under the constraint of theory, of course, we might assert that humans are
merely complex systems of particles. But we do not believe this. Or at least
we do not believe it when we have the "direct experience . . . of seeing a
person and being seen as a person" (p. 124), or of actually "looking into the
eyes of others" (pp. 123-24). In those moments we perceive "the extraordi
nariness of our individuality," so that a "sense of life springs within us" and
we know that there is more to a person than system and process and parti
cles in motion (pp. 123-24).
F. Holding the Line, Hopefully

When we are being reflective and candid we know these things, Vining
suggests. But under the pressure of a theory, we may be induced to tell our
selves otherwise-to reduce persons to objective processes-and we may
also be induced to act on those inauthentic doctrines. The moral atrocities of
the twentieth century were grotesque manifestations of this possibility. De
humanizing racism and slavery are manifestations of the same possibility.
Horrible as they are, however, these enormities are in a sense still con
fined: in scientific experimentation and in slavery only particular classes of
persons are relegated to non-person status. The claims of naturalistic total
theory, by contrast, would have more catastrophic implications: the person
would be negated entirely. Vining more than once makes the point that the
view of persons that is advocated by the proponents of total theory is a sort
of universalization of the view taken of Jews and blacks in fascist and slave
3
regimes: in total theory "[a]ll humanity is the target." 7
His concern is not confined to humanity, however. Though much of the
discussion works from what he takes to be a common distinction between
humans and other animals-between the child and the sparrow-Vining
himself doubts that, viewed as a moral distinction, this line can hold. We
react with moral outrage-or at least we do if we have not been deformed
by culture or theory-when we learn of experimentation on humans. Most
of us may not instinctively react in the same way to experimentation on
nonhuman animals. But our different attitudes may merely show that we are

36. Pp. 67-70, 103--08. This particular line of reflection is developed more fully in Vining's
earlier work. See supra note 7.
37. Pp. 26-27. Although the nature of the presentation is quite different, the viewpoint here
and through much of the book is reminiscent of C.S. Lewis's small classic, THE A BOLITION OF MAN
( 1944). The similarities to Lewis are sufficiently strong that it is hard not to see in the book's title
THE SONG SPARROW AND THE CHILD-an allusion to the Oxford pub known as "The Eagle and the
Child" or "The Bird and the Baby" in which Lewis regularly met with J.R.R. Tolkien and others to
read and discuss each o thers' work.
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under the same kinds of reflective disabilities with respect to animals from
which the researchers in Manchuria and Germany suffered with respect to
humans. Vining suggests that if we look at an animal "eye to eye," if we
really look and reflect, we will see that the moral divide we often draw be
tween humans and other animals is unsustainable (p. 143). "The strictest
'rationalist,' most fastidious in his arguments, who has a dog, who nuzzles it
and cares for it, and weeps when it dies, may not be a strict rationalist in
actual beliefs" (p. 17).
The point is powerfully made, I think, in an incident recounted by Timothy Jackson:
Walking dullyalong Temple Street in New Haven, one March dayin 1979,
I awoke from a rationalist's dream. I heard over my right shoulder the
screeching of tires, then a loud "Thump!" followed by horrific howling. I
turned to see a beautiful black Labrador retriever staggering along the side
of the road with blood dripping from its nose and mouth. It was instantly
clear, to me and the other pedestrians transfixed on the sidewalk, that this
dog was doomed. Its internal injuries from being hit bythe car, which did
not stop, were so severe that nothing could be done. It was onlya matter of
time ... and time seemed to clot more and more slowly with each high
pitched "Yelp!" from the beast. It obviously did not know how to die, be
cause it came up to two of us in front of Timothy Dwight College and
seemed to look imploringly into our eyes for some sort of explanation. I
suddenly felt the need to beg pardon.
Partly inspired by Kant's speculation that animal subjectivity is "less even
than a dream," I had just two months before written a graduate seminar pa
per arguing that animals don't

feel morally significant pain .... Now,

confronted bythe Lab's agony, I saw how absurdly callous and callow this
opinion was. I did not go through any elaborate process of reasoning; I
simply felt for the dying dog so obviously in pain and so needlessly un
done. As it slumped down in a patch of grass, I was touched by its misery
38
and ashamed of myself.

Vining's questioning of the line between song sparrow and child does
not lead him to any particular recommendations for terminating research
involving experimentation on animals. On the contrary, he acknowledges
that such research will often be warranted, just as there are situations in
which human lives must be sacrificed for the benefit of other humans. More
generally, Vining acknowledges that economics-the "dismal science" of
making tradeoffs-has its necessary domain. But we will make the tradeoffs
differently, he suggests, if we acknowledge the moral status of the subjects
we are sacrificing (pp. 146-48).
Nor is the point merely that nonhuman animals should be included along
with humans in the class presumptively entitled to concern and protection.
That sort of agenda would immediately raise boundary questions. What
kinds of animals should be included in the class deserving of respect and

38. TIMOTHY P. JACKSON, THE PRIORITY OF LovE: CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND SOCIAL Jus
TICE, at xii-xiii (2003).
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concern? Dogs, cats, and dolphins? Snails? Amoeba? Only animals? Vining
notes the issue but does not dwell on it: he simply says that deciding where
to draw the line between what is and is not morally valuable-between
"spirit" and mere particles in motion-requires ongoing reflection (pp. 14243). We might draw the line in a variety of places: Vining does not pretend
to tell us exactly where to draw it. That is not the book's purpose.
Its central purpose, rather, is ti:> prevent the obliteration of the line itself
by the claims of total theory in the way that so many theorists and scientists
allow, at least if we take their statements at face value. Everything is parti
cles and force fields, process and system. So say the theorists. But Vining's
reflection is a powerful affirmation that we-and they, the theorists them
selves-do not really believe this. To assent to this creed would be "a form
of death, a giving up, a farewell" (p. 20). Conversely, by resisting the claims
of total theory we can hold onto the hope with which the book ends-for an
eventual "convergence of scientific and other forms of thought" in which
"the scientist in all [is] no longer overshadowed by the antiscientist in any"
(pp. 148-52, 135).

